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DISCUSSION: 
SALMON ON EXPLANATORY RELEVANCE* 
CHRISTOPHER READ HITCHCOCKtt 
Department of Philosophy 
Rice University 
One of the motivations for Salmon's (1984) causal theory of explanation was 
the explanatory irrelevance exhibited by many arguments conforming to Hempel's 
covering-law models of explanation. However, the nexus of causal processes 
and interactions characterized by Salmon is not rich enough to supply the nec- 
essary conception of explanatory relevance. Salmon's (1994) revised theory, 
which is briefly criticized on independent grounds, fares no better. There is some 
possibility that the two-tiered structure of explanation described by Salmon (1984) 
may be pressed into service, but more work would have to be done. Ironically, 
Salmon's difficulties are similar to those suffered by his seventeenth-century 
predecessors. 
1. Introduction. A generation ago, Hempel's covering-law models of 
scientific explanation were widely accepted among philosophers of sci- 
ence. One of the critics who has been most active in dissolving this con- 
sensus is Wesley Salmon. Many of Salmon's criticisms have centered on 
a common theme: Hempel's models fail to capture the intuitive relation 
of explanatory relevance that holds between that which explains and that 
which is explained. Salmon has argued that this relation is irreducibly 
causal, and he has built his own account of scientific explanation around 
a well-developed theory of causality (Salmon 1984), which he has re- 
cently revised (Salmon 1994). I will argue that Salmon's causal theory 
of explanation-in both its original and revised form-also fails to cap- 
ture the intuitive relation of explanatory relevance. 
2. D-N Explanation and its Discontents. The modern history of the 
philosophical study of scientific explanation began with Hempel and 
Oppenheim's "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" (Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948). In this essay, Hempel and Oppenheim put forward 
what Hempel would later call the Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model 
of explanation. In his later essay, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," 
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Hempel (1965) defended the original theory, and augmented it with models 
of statistical explanation. He summarized his conception of explanation 
as follows: 
. . all scientific explanation involves, explicitly or by implication, 
a subsumption of its subject matter under general regularities; ... it 
seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena 
by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus. (Hempel 1965, 488) 
Let E be a statement that describes some event that is to be explained- 
the explanandum. A D-N explanation of this event has the following form: 
C1, C2, , Ck 
L, L2, . . .,Lr 
.. E. 
Cl, C2, . . ., Ck are statements describing particular states of affairs, which 
may be thought of as initial conditions (although they are not officially 
required to temporally precede E), and LI, L2, . .., Lr are general laws; 
together, these form the explanans. Thus an event is explained by show- 
ing that its occurence can be deduced from some set of initial conditions 
together with general laws. The account is called 'deductive-nomological' 
because it involves deduction from laws. Hempel considers the D-N model 
(as well as his statistical models) to embody what Dray (1957) has called 
a "covering-law" conception of scientific explanation: the explanandum 
is explained by being subsumed under general laws. 
Salmon's writings (e.g., 1965, 1971, 1984) contain a sustained attack 
on the D-N model and the other covering-law models of explanation. This 
attack exploits several examples, now well known, where the conditions 
of D-N explanation seem to be met, but where the purported explanation 
seems to be defective. Here are two of the more famous examples: 
This sample of table salt dissolves in water, for it has had a dissolving 
spell cast on it, and all samples of table salt that have had dissolving 
spells cast on them dissolve in water. (Kyburg 1965, 147) 
John Jones avoided becoming pregnant during the past year, for he 
has taken his wife's birth control pills regularly, and every man who 
regularly takes birth control pills avoids pregnancy. (Salmon 1971, 
34) 
In each case, the condition described in the explanans-the hexing of the 
salt and the faithful consumption of contraceptives-is irrelevant to the 
outcome in question. 
Salmon (1971) attempted to analyze this notion of explanatory rele- 
vance in terms of statistical relevance. Among men, the consumption of 
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oral contraceptives is statistically irrelevant to pregnancy: those men who 
take birth control pills become pregnant with exactly the same statistical 
frequency as those who do not. Analogously, among samples of salt, 
hexing is statistically irrelevant to dissolution. By 1984, however, Salmon 
had concluded that statistical relevance relations alone could not provide 
a satisfactory account of explanation: explanatory relevance is an irreduc- 
ibly causal concept. Salmon summarizes his conclusion by advocating the 
replacement of two words in the summary of Hempel's account cited 
above: 
. . 
.my suggestion for modification would be to substitute the words 
"how they fit into a causal nexus" for "that they fit into a nomic 
nexus." (Salmon 1984, 19) 
Salmon then aims to provide an account of the causal nexus: it is a net- 
work of causal processes and causal interactions. 
3. Causal Processes and Causal Interactions. Salmon's theory of cau- 
sation is influenced, in part, by foundational work in the special theory 
of relativity. Presentations of that theory sometimes commence with the 
following axiom: nothing can travel faster than light. In order for this 
axiom to be true, the scope of the quantifier 'nothing' needs to be re- 
stricted, and therein lies the connection with causation. By pointing a 
laser at a sufficiently distant wall, and rotating the laser with a sufficient 
(but subluminal) velocity, it would be possible to make the spot of light 
cast on the wall move faster than the speed of light. But this moving spot 
of light would not instantiate the sort of supraluminal velocity proscribed 
by the special theory of relativity. In particular, this moving image could 
not be exploited to send messages from one point on the wall to another. 
For example, suppose that a filter is held in front of a small section of 
the wall, thus diminishing the intensity of the light striking that spot. The 
moving light spot will not retain its diminished intensity as it sweeps out 
its path, so this 'message' will not be transmitted. The anthropocentric 
reference to our inability to transmit messages may be avoided; what is 
essential is that the image be incapable of conveying any sort of causal 
influence. The notion of a causal process-a process capable of carrying 
causal influence-is therefore of extreme physical importance. 
Salmon's theory takes the notion of a process as a primitive. Infor- 
mally, a process is a path through space-time that exhibits a certain con- 
tinuity in its properties. A moving shadow is a process: it may be slightly 
darker in some regions, or grow lighter with time, but if there is a sudden 
difference in brightness between two nearby points in space-time, then 
one of those points lies outside the spatiotemporal boundaries of the mov- 
ing shadow. Processes come in two varieties: pseudoprocesses-such as 
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the moving shadow or the moving spot of light on the wall-and causal 
processes. A causal process, according to Salmon (1984), is one that is 
capable of transmitting a mark, where mark-transmission is defined as 
follows: 
MT: Let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other 
processes, would remain uniform with respect to a characteristic Q, 
which it would manifest consistently over an interval that includes 
both of the space-time points A and B (A 7 B). Then, a mark (con- 
sisting of a modification of Q into Q'), which has been introduced 
into process P by means of a single local interaction at point A, is 
transmitted to point B if P manifests the modification Q' at B and at 
all stages of the process between A and B without additional inter- 
ventions. (Salmon 1984, 148) 
This definition of mark-transmission is counterfactual in nature: whether 
a process transmits a mark depends upon how it would behave if un- 
marked. Similarly, the definition of a causal process also has a counter- 
factual element: a causal process is one that is capable of transmitting 
some type of mark regardless of whether any marks are in fact being 
transmitted. Salmon argues that the required counterfactuals are subject 
to empirical test, and thus unproblematic. We know, for example, that a 
baseball is a causal process; for when baseballs are scuffed by small pieces 
of sandpaper-as occasionally happens when pitchers use illegal means 
to achieve baffling aerodynamic effects-these scuffs remain on the ball. 
This account of causal processes provides a theory of causal propa- 
gation, the transmission of causal influence. Salmon is also interested in 
causal production. According to Salmon, many changes in causal pro- 
cesses originate in causal interactions, which sometimes occur when causal 
processes intersect. The definition of a causal interaction presented in 
Salmon (1984) is as follows: 
CI: Let PI and P2 be two processes that intersect with one another at 
the space-time point S, which belongs to the histories of both. Let Q 
be a characteristic that process PI would exhibit throughout an in- 
terval (which includes subintervals on both sides of S in the history 
of PI) if the intersection with P2 did not occur; let R be a characteristic 
that process P2 would exhibit throughout an interval (which includes 
subintervals on both sides of S in the history of P2) if the intersection 
with P1 did not occur. Then, the intersection of PI and P2 at S con- 
stitutes a causal interaction if: 
1) PI exhibits the characteristic Q before S, but it exhibits a 
modified characteristic Q' throughout an interval immediately fol- 
lowing S; and 
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2) P2 exhibits the characteristic R before S, but it exhibits a 
modified characteristic R' throughout an interval immediately fol- 
lowing S. (p. 171) 
... In order to transform CI into a condition that is necessary as 
well as sufficient, we need simply to say that a causal interaction 
occurs if and only if there exist characteristics Q and R that fulfill 
the conditions stated previously. (p. 174) 
An intersection of causal processes is not always a causal interaction. If 
two light beams cross, there is a local distortion of each one, but each 
beam continues on as if there had been no intersection. By contrast, a 
collision between two cars is a causal interaction, each car exhibiting a 
modified characteristic which persists after the collision: bent fenders. 
Note that condition CI, like MT, involves a counterfactual component: 
changes in the properties of intersecting processes constitute a causal in- 
teraction only if those changes would not have occurred without the in- 
tersection. While Salmon presents the two definitions in this order for 
heuristic reasons, CI is logically prior to MT: introduction of a mark into 
a causal process is a special case of causal interaction (Salmon 1994, 
298). 
A causal nexus, then, is a physical network consisting of causal pro- 
cesses and interactions. What is it to show how an explanandum fits into 
a causal nexus? Presumably it is to describe the location of that explan- 
andum within such a nexus-to provide a kind of causal map. Salmon 
expands upon this answer by distinguishing between two different aspects 
of explanation: 
Suppose we want to explain some event E. We may look at E as 
occupying a finite volume of four-dimensional space-time [see figure 
1]. If we want to show why E occurred, we fill in the causally rel- 
evant processes and interactions that occupy the past light cone of E. 
This is the etiological aspect of our explanation; it exhibits E as 
embedded in its causal nexus. If we want to show why E manifests 
certain characteristics, we place inside the volume occupied by E the 
internal causal mechanisms that account for E's nature. This is the 
constitutive aspect of our explanation; it lays bare the causal structure 
of E. (Salmon 1984, 275) 
Salmon (1994) has recently abandoned definitions MT and CI in favor of 
a new characterization of causal processes and interactions. Because it is 
not as familiar as the old theory, I will postpone discussion of the new 
account until Section 5. So far as I can tell, the new characterization of 
the causal nexus has not affected Salmon's view of the role that the causal 
nexus plays in explanation. 
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Constitutive 
Aspect 
/~/ '/\~ ~~ \ Y\ \7 Etiological 
Aspect 
Fig. 1. The two aspects of explanation. 
A caveat: several authors have suggested that there are fields of inquiry 
where explanations do not accord with Salmon's account: formal lin- 
guistics, pure mathematics, general relativity, and quantum mechanics to 
name a few (see Kitcher 1989 and Woodward 1989 for examples). These 
tend to be areas where the notion of causal explanation may not be ap- 
propriate. Yet, if Salmon succeeds only in characterizing a subclass of 
scientific explanations-causal explanations-he will still have accom- 
plished a great deal. In the sequel, I will restrict attention to examples in 
which causal explanation is clearly appropriate. 
4. Relevance Revisited. One of Salmon's motives for abandoning Hem- 
pel's covering-law models of explanation is their failure to capture the 
notion of explanatory relevance. Does Salmon's theory do any better? 
Let us look again at the two counterexamples to Hempel's theory. If in 
the process of hexing the salt, the (person dressed up as a) witch never 
initiated a causal process that interacted with the salt, then it would seem 
that Salmon's theory would give us grounds for rejecting the hex as ex- 
planatorily irrelevant. Let us suppose, however, that during the casting 
of her spell, our would-be sorceress touched the salt with a wand. This 
is a genuine causal interaction, so what would justify our rejection of it 
as irrelevant? Similarly, there were a series of causal interactions between 
John Jones and some birth control pills: what entitles us to reject these 
as explanatorily irrelevant? Salmon's answer would appear to be "noth- 
ing," but let us explore the question a little more deeply. 
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One difficulty with these two counterexamples to Hempel's theory is 
that the causal processes and interactions involved in each are quite com- 
plex, making it difficult to see how Salmon's account might treat them. 
The following example is a more sanitized one: In a game of pool, the 
cue ball, eight ball, and corner pocket all lie on a straight line, and a 
player (let us call her "Pennsylvania Slims") manages to hit the cue ball 
in the right direction so as to sink the eight ball into the corner pocket. 
Before hitting the cue ball, Ms. Slims chalked her cue stick with blue 
chalk. Some of this chalk came off on the cue ball when it was struck. 
We may now construct a D-N 'explanation' of the sinking of the eight 
ball, citing as initial conditions the linear momentum imparted to the cue 
ball and the blue spot that it acquired, together with the law that physical 
systems containing objects with blue spots have their linear momentum 
conserved. (It may be objected that this is not a law, but a similar ob- 
jection may be raised against the original counterexamples.) This defec- 
tive explanation involves a failure of relevance of the familiar sort: the 
blue spot was irrelevant to the final position of the eight ball. 
How would Salmon's theory handle this example? Looking into the 
past light cone of the sunken eight ball we find: a causal interaction be- 
tween the cue stick and the cue ball; the moving cue ball, which is a 
causal process; a causal interaction between the cue ball and the eight 
ball; and another causal process consisting of the moving eight ball. The 
explanation will then exhibit the location of the explanandum within this 
network of causal processes and interactions. (Note that we have ignored 
the constitutive aspect of explanation here, but the microstructure of the 
eight ball in the comer pocket clearly does not show why the eight ball 
manifests the characteristic of being in the comer pocket.) Where, in any 
of this, are we to find the desired relations of explanatory relevance? 
The intuitive relation of explanatory relevance does not hold between 
regions of space-time: it holds between the properties instantiated in cer- 
tain regions of space-time (or perhaps between the propositions that cer- 
tain properties are instantiated in certain regions of space-time). We judge 
that the linear momentum of the cue ball is relevant to the final location 
of the eight ball, but that the blue color on (part of) the cue ball is not. 
Such properties of causal processes do have a role to play in Salmon's 
theory. A process is causal if it is capable of transmitting a mark, where 
a mark is some change in one of the properties of a process, and a mark 
is transmitted if the new property is manifested for some duration of time. 
Causal interaction is likewise characterized in terms of modifications of 
properties of processes. Nonetheless, Salmon's explanations do not seem 
to cite these properties. In locating the sunken eight ball within its causal 
nexus, the only property that is ascribed to the cue ball is that of being 
a causal process. 
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Reflecting on the counterexamples to the D-N model, it is hard to resist 
the conclusion that our intuitive judgments of explanatory relevance cor- 
respond closely to our judgments about the truth of counterfactuals: the 
salt would have dissolved even if it had not been hexed; John Jones would 
have avoided pregnancy even if he had not swallowed the pills; the eight 
ball would have landed in the comer pocket even if the cue ball had not 
been marked with a blue spot. This is not to say that explanatory rele- 
vance ought to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence. Nor 
is it to say that our judgments of explanatory relevance correspond more 
closely to our judgments of counterfactual dependence than, say, to our 
judgments about statistical relevance. Skyrms (1984) argues persuasively 
that our judgments of statistical relevance and counterfactual dependence 
(and many other things besides) coincide in ordinary cases. I wish only 
to draw the rather weak conclusion that a successful account of expla- 
nation had better make the relation of explanatory relevance look roughly 
like that of counterfactual dependence. Salmon's characterization of causal 
processes and interactions does have the relation of counterfactual de- 
pendence-or something suitably close to it-built in. But it is built in 
in such a way that descriptions of the causal nexus are not specific in 
their counterfactual commitments. For example, in stating that a process 
is a causal process rather than a pseudoprocess, it is asserted only that 
some later properties of the process are dependent upon some earlier prop- 
erties; no information is given about what these properties are. Our de- 
mand that explanations provide relevant information requires something 
stronger-that we be told which earlier properties the properties specified 
in the explanandum depend upon. 
A natural response at this point would be that the explanatorily relevant 
properties are those in virtue of which processes and interactions in the 
nexus satisfy conditions MT and CI. This does not help: when it comes 
to categorizing a process as causal, for example, any transmitted mark is 
as good as any other. Consider the moving cue ball, one of the causal 
processes involved in our central example. What makes this a causal pro- 
cess rather than a pseudoprocess? The moving cue ball is capable of trans- 
mitting a mark. The cue ball would not have had a blue spot had it not 
interacted with the cue stick; thus, this interaction marked the cue ball 
with a blue spot. The cue ball retained the blue spot as it moved, so this 
mark was transmitted. But this was not the only mark transmitted by the 
cue ball: in striking the cue ball, Ms. Slims gave it a linear momentum 
it would not otherwise have had, and this change in linear momentum 
counts as a mark as well. Since the cue ball continued to move with 
(approximately) the amount of linear momentum that was imparted to it 
in its interaction with the cue stick, this mark was also transmitted. For 
purposes of constituting the cue ball as a causal process, both of these 
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marks are on a par. From the perspective of explanation, however, these 
two marks are not on a par: the linear momentum of the cue ball was 
relevant to the eight ball's landing in the comer pocket; the blue spot on 
the cue ball was irrelevant to this outcome. 
As an illustration of how a more satisfactory account of explanatory 
relevance might proceed, consider the work of James Woodward (1979, 
1984). Woodward argues that explanations must provide the resources 
for answering 'what-if-things-had-been-different' questions. The appli- 
cation of this idea to singular causal explanations is straightforward: if 
something like Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation is close to being 
right, then to cite the cause of an event is to provide information about 
what would have happened had the cause not occurred. But Woodward 
has also argued that his account provides a diagnosis of why some der- 
ivations from initial conditions plus laws strike us as explanatory, while 
other instances fitting the D-N schema are defective. Typically, the suc- 
cessful D-N explanations involve laws such as Newton's law of gravi- 
tation or Coulomb's law that are expressed in functional form. In these 
cases, the explanandum is explained, not by subsuming it under laws of 
nature, but by showing how the outcome in question is sensitive to the 
nature of the initial conditions cited. He states this "requirement of func- 
tional interdependence" as follows: 
The law occurring in the explanans of a scientific explanation of some 
explanandum E must be stated in terms of variables or parameters 
variations in the values of which will permit the derivation of other 
explananda which are appropriately different from E. (Woodward 1979, 
46.) 
The D-N 'explanation' of the sinking of the eight ball is defective because 
of its failure as a resource for answering 'what-if-things-had-been- 
different' questions: it falsely suggests that if Pennsylvania Slims had not 
put a blue spot on the cue ball, she would not have made her winning 
shot. The more traditional counterexamples would receive similar diag- 
noses. 
If one adheres to a counterfactual or probabilistic theory of causation, 
the coincidence of our judgments of explanatory relevance with those of 
counterfactual dependence or statistical relevance strongly suggests that 
explanatory relevance just is causal relevance. Salmon (1971) seems to 
have had some hope that an adequate probabilistic theory of causation 
could be given, so this coincidence of judgments is suggestive of how 
Salmon himself might have arrived at the conclusion that explanatory 
relevance is a causal concept; I think that it captures what is plausible in 
this view today. Salmon later came to reject probabilistic theories of cau- 
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sation.' In so doing, he divorced his theory of causation from those con- 
siderations that made a causal theory of explanatory relevance plausible 
in the first place. 
5. The Conserved Quantity Theory. Many criticisms of Salmon's (1984) 
theory have focused on his criteria MT and CI, claiming that they admit 
of counterexamples (e.g., Glymour 1982, Kitcher 1989, and Dowe 1992.) 
Kitcher presents the following example: 
Imagine that a vehicle equipped with skis is sliding on an ice rink 
and casting a shadow. A projectile is thrown in such a way that it 
lands at the edge of the shadow with a horizontal component of ve- 
locity equal to that of the shadow of the vehicle. Because the pro- 
jectile lies across the edge there is an immediate distortion of the 
shadow shape. Moreover, the distortion persists because the projec- 
tile retains its position relative to the vehicle (and to its shadow). 
(Kitcher 1989, 464) 
In this example, the moving shadow meets condition MT, and so should 
be countenanced as a causal process, but moving shadows are paradig- 
matic pseudoprocesses. 
The moral that Kitcher draws from such examples is that Salmon's 
theory of causation is beset with epistemological difficulties. A successful 
theory of causation ought to account for our ability to acquire causal 
knowledge. The counterexamples show that MT and CI are not reliable 
guides to the discovery of causal structure. More generally, because 
Salmon's definitions of causal processes and interactions rely so heavily 
on counterfactuals, and because the truth values of these counterfactuals 
are not as readily determined by empirical tests as Salmon would have 
us believe, causal relations become epistemically inaccessible on Salmon's 
theory (Kitcher 1989, 470-475). 
I think that Kitcher is overstating the case here. By drawing out the 
presuppositions of the first signal principle of special relativity, and by 
giving numerous illustrations, Salmon has made it abundantly clear that 
there is a genuine physical distinction between causal processes and in- 
teractions and their acausal cousins. The application and tracing of marks 
often enables us to discover causal processes and interactions, although 
in these post-positivist times we do not expect there to be any specifiable 
'See (Salmon 1984, chapter 7) for his reasons. Salmon did not explicitly attack Lewis's 
counterfactual theory in this chapter, although his criticisms encompass it. In particular, 
he considers 'the method of successive reconditionalization' as an attempt to save prob- 
abilistic theories of causality from certain counterexamples (Salmon 1984, pp. 196-202); 
this is essentially the method that Lewis himself employs to rescue the probabilistic version 
of his counterfactual theories from similar counterexamples (Lewis 1986, pp. 179-180). 
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set of observable conditions that is both necessary and sufficient for the 
presence of causal processes and interactions. The counterexamples pre- 
sented by Kitcher and others may well undermine MT and CI as defini- 
tions of causal processes and interactions, but it does not follow that they 
are epistemically inaccessible or otherwise philosophically suspect. While 
a more accurate characterization of causal processes and interactions would 
be desirable, the general program of appealing to causal processes and 
interactions in an attempt to understand the aims of scientific explanation 
is not seriously undermined by such counterexamples. 
Nonetheless, Salmon is concerned to provide a more adequate char- 
acterization of causal processes and interactions, so he takes these criti- 
cisms to heart. He follows Kitcher in pinning the blame for the counter- 
examples on the counterfactuals involved in the formulation of MT and 
CI. Influenced heavily by Dowe (1992), he replaces these definitions with 
the following counterfactual-free definitions: 
1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines which in- 
volves exchange of a conserved (invariant) quantity. 
2. A causal process is a world-line of an object that transmits a non- 
zero amount of a conserved (invariant) quantity at each moment 
of its history (each spacetime point of its trajectory). 
3. A process transmits a conserved (invariant) quantity from A to B 
(A # B) if it possesses this quantity at A and at B and at every 
stage of the process between A and B without any interactions in 
the half-open interval (A, B] that involve an exchange of that par- 
ticular conserved (invariant) quantity. (Salmon 1994, 303-308, 
with some minor changes made for clarity.) 
A quantity is conserved if, in a closed system, it is constant under trans- 
lations in time; a quantity is invariant if it is constant under coordinate 
transformations corresponding to changes in reference frame; and a quan- 
tity is exchanged if at least one of the processes involved in an intersec- 
tion experiences a change in the value of that quantity. (Dowe (1992, 
210) offers a slightly more refined definition that accommodates Y- and 
X-type interactions as well as X-type interactions.) Definition 1 is taken 
straight from Dowe (1992) and definition 2 is a modified version of a 
definition found there. Salmon discusses the merits of formulating the 
theory in terms of invariant quantities rather than conserved quantities, 
and tentatively opts for the former. 
In light of the arguments of the previous section, it might be expected 
that the need for counterfactuals is not so easily avoided. Suppose that a 
shadow is cast on a metal plate that has a uniform nonzero charge density 
on its surface. The shadow then moves across the plate in such a way 
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that the area of the plate in shadow remains constant. The shadow then 
possesses a constant quantity of electric charge (a quantity that is both 
conserved and invariant) as it moves across the plate. The shadow is not 
participating in any causal interactions as it moves; in particular it is not 
being bombarded with photons as is the spot of light in a similar example 
discussed by Salmon (1994, 308). By definition 3, the shadow transmits 
the charge, and by definition 2, it is a causal process. Note that the older, 
counterfactual-laden theory correctly rules that this moving shadow is a 
pseudoprocess, since any (hypothetical) local modification of the charge 
density would not be transmitted by the shadow. A counterexample to 
definition 1 results when two such shadows cross and change size- 
perhaps as a result of some interaction between the objects casting the 
shadows-thus 'exchanging' electric charge. 
It will not do to reject this counterexample on the grounds that the 
charge possessed by the moving shadow is not strictly conserved (because 
it will not be the case that one electron always enters the shadow precisely 
when another one leaves it), or on the grounds that it does not really 
participate in no further interactions (even shadows are hit by photons). 
These considerations would rule out any macroscopic process, such as 
the speeding bullet discussed by Salmon (1994, 309). Strictly speaking, 
one causal process dies and a new one is born whenever the bullet in- 
teracts with an air molecule and exchanges energy; but for most purposes, 
we may treat the bullet as a continuous process. It seems that definitions 
1, 2 and 3 entitle us to treat the charged shadow similarly. 
Another difficulty concerns the choice between formulating the theory 
in terms of conserved or invariant quantities. It seems to me that con- 
served quantities are uniquely suited to the goal of purging counterfac- 
tuals. Consider Salmon's old definition of causal interaction, CI. Ac- 
cording to this definition, an intersection of processes is a causal interaction 
only if each process undergoes a change that would not have taken place 
without the intersection. The counterfactual clause is needed: the posi- 
tions of two light pulses that cross undergo change, but this is a paradigm 
example of an intersection that is not a causal interaction. CI avoids coun- 
terexample because the positions would have changed in any event. It is 
not clear how a restriction to invariant quantities avoids this need for 
recourse to counterfactuals. Any quantity that is not conserved may undergo 
uncaused change, making possible spurious 'exchanges' like that de- 
scribed above. The advantage of conserved quantities is that any change 
in a conserved quantity is one that would not have happened otherwise. 
This last observation also points to a difficulty for the conserved quan- 
tity formulation of the theory, however. Suppose it be asked how we are 
to define 'conserved quantity'. A conserved quantity is one that remains 
constant through time in a closed system, but what is a closed system 
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but a system that does not engage in any causal interactions? In other 
words, is not the concept of conserved quantity to be explicated in terms 
of the concept of causal interaction, rather than the other way around? It 
seems to me that conservation laws presuppose the notion of causal in- 
teraction in much the same way that the first signal principle of special 
relativity presupposes the notion of a causal process. Without the restric- 
tion to causal processes, the first signal principle is false; without the 
exclusion of causal interactions, the law of conservation of electric charge 
is false. 
I suggest that the conserved quantity theory is best viewed as aug- 
menting rather than replacing the mark-transmission theory. Neither the- 
ory provides a reductive analysis of the concepts of causal process and 
interaction, and neither provides infallible rules for detecting causal pro- 
cesses and interactions. Rather, each provides guidelines for recognizing 
causal processes and interactions, as well as reasons for thinking that 
these concepts are presupposed by physical science. 
Let us put these considerations aside, however, and take the new theory 
at face value. The question of central concern is whether it avoids the 
difficulties raised in the previous section. The answer is "no": the ar- 
guments of the previous section may be repeated mutatis mutandis. In 
describing the location of some explanandum within a network of causal 
processes and interactions, one implies only that some conserved quantity 
is transmitted by each process, and that some conserved quantity is ex- 
changed during each interaction. Even if we are entitled, when giving 
explanations, to appeal to the quantities that are in fact transmitted and 
exchanged, the explanatorily relevant properties will not be singled out. 
Consider again the example of Pennsylvania Slims' winning shot. The 
moving cue ball transmits many conserved quantities: linear momentum, 
angular momentum, and electric charge, for example. (Actually, the moving 
cue ball will be continually exchanging these quantities with the pool 
table, but we may treat the continuous transmission of these quantities as 
a good approximation.) Of these, only linear momentum is explanatorily 
relevant to the final location of the eight ball. (It is left as an exercise 
for the reader to rewrite the last three sentences in terms of invariant 
quantities.) And this is the example that is superficially most congenial 
to Salmon's approach: the prospects for explaining John Jones's failure 
to become pregnant in terms of the exchange and transmission of con- 
served quantities never looked bright. 
The concepts of causal process and interaction are physically legitimate 
and philosophically interesting regardless of whether either of Salmon's 
theories provides a definitive characterization of them. But these concepts 
do not provide the resources to explicate the notion of explanatory rel- 
evance that Hempel's models failed to capture. 
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6. The S-R Basis. The target of my attack has been a theory of expla- 
nation consisting of the conjunction of the following theses: (1) causal 
explanations provide descriptions of the causal nexus; and (2) the causal 
nexus is nothing more than a network of physical processes and inter- 
actions described (albeit imperfectly) by (2a) MT and CI, or (2b) defi- 
nitions 1 through 3. But are causal processes and interactions really the 
only explanatory resources available on Salmon's view? Salmon (1984) 
incorporates part of his earlier (1971) Statistical-Relevance (S-R) theory 
of explanation; in the later book, Salmon still maintains that explanations 
have an "S-R basis": 
. . 
.explanation is a two-tiered affair. At the most basic level, it is 
necessary, for purposes of explanation, to subsume the event-to-be- 
explained under an appropriate set of statistical relevance relations, 
much as was required under the S-R model. (1984, 22) 
The S-R model did offer an account of explanatory relevance; the inclu- 
sion of the S-R basis in Salmon's (1984) theory of explanation suggests 
that he may simply co-opt this treatment. 
Salmon does not take statistical relevance to be constitutive of causal 
relevance: Salmon (1984) repudiates probabilistic theories of causation, 
and Salmon (1994) reiterates this. So if Salmon is to retain the treatment 
of explanatory relevance in terms of statistical relevance, he must either: 
(i) admit that explanatory relevance is not a causal concept; or (ii) estab- 
lish a role for the S-R basis within genuinely causal explanations. Salmon 
would clearly prefer to follow the second route, else he would not have 
felt the need to supplement the S-R model with a theory of causation. 
Unfortunately, the explanatory import of the S-R basis within Salmon's 
(1984) theory is not clear. In some passages, Salmon seems to suggest 
that the S-R basis is like an explanatory stepping stone, to be itself ex- 
plained in terms of causal structure. For example, the passage just cited 
continues: 
At the second level, it seems to me, the statistical relevance relations 
that are invoked at the first level must be explained in terms of causal 
relations. (1984, 22; see also the similar passage on p. 261.) 
Other passages suggest that probability relations only supply evidence for 
the causal relations that are genuinely explanatory: 
The explanatory relevance of statistical relevance relations is indirect. 
Their fundamental import lies in the fact . . . that they constitute 
evidence for causal relations. (1984, 192; see also note 10, p. 34, 
and p. 265, where Salmon alludes approvingly to others who have 
expressed this view.) 
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Pending further clarification, it is difficult to assess the prospects for pro- 
viding a causal account of explanatory relevance by means of the S-R 
basis. 
Here is a very programmatic suggestion. In Hitchcock (1995), I show 
that objections to probabilistic theories of causation of the sort leveled 
by Salmon may be avoided. But even those who defend probabilistic the- 
ories of causation often claim that it is not possible to provide a reductive 
analysis of causation in terms of probability alone. Typically, the goal of 
the enterprise has been seen as one of imposing probabilistic constraints 
upon an antecedently given causal relation. (See, for example, Eells 1991.) 
I have argued (1993) that we instead conceive of a probabilistic theory 
of causation as providing a taxonomy of the primitive relation of causal 
relevance. Either way, it is quite possible that the causal processes and 
interactions described by Salmon provide the foundation for this primitive 
relation. If this is correct, it may be possible to collapse Salmon's two 
explanatory tiers so that causal and explanatory relevance relations are 
constituted jointly by relations of probabilistic relevance and physical 
connections. The proposed marriage of probabilistic and process theories 
of causation is one that merits further exploration. 
7. The New Mechanical Philosophy. Salmon, following up on a re- 
mark made in Glymour (1982), refers to his account of scientific expla- 
nation as 'the mechanical philosophy' (Salmon 1984, 278-279). Glymour 
was alluding to Salmon's apparent commitment to action by contact, but 
I think that the similarities between Salmon's mechanism and that of his 
seventeenth-century predecessors are more profound than has previously 
been realized. Central to the world view of the seventeenth-century me- 
chanists was the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The 
primary qualities were size, shape, position, motion and duration (this 
list is Descartes'; he sometimes includes number). These were contrasted 
with the secondary qualities of heat, taste, odor, sound, and color. The 
primary qualities were those properties of objects that could be charac- 
terized geometrically. According to the mechanists, all physical phenom- 
ena (in contrast with mental phenomena) were ultimately to be explained 
in terms of the primary qualities of objects. Historian of science Eduard 
Dijksterhuis writes: 
The only properties recognized as explanatory principles were the 
size, the shape, and the state of motion of corpuscles, supplemented 
by characteristics of their aggregates that could also be defined geo- 
metrically (1961, 432.) 
The appeal of the mechanical philosophy lay, in part, in the austerity of 
its explanatory store: by claiming that all phenomena could be explained 
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in terms of the geometric properties of physical objects, the mechanical 
philosophy offered the promise of a simple, unified theory of nature. But 
its source of appeal was also its undoing: the explanatory store was simply 
too impoverished to account for the phenomena of the physical world. 
According to the new mechanism, to explain a phenomenon is to show 
how it fits into a causal nexus. Salmon's theory is appealing for much 
the same reason that the world view of his seventeenth-century forebears 
was: it is ontologically austere. The causal nexus consists only of physical 
processes and interactions of a sort that we are already committed to, 
both in everyday life and in physical science. The theory is refreshingly 
free of metaphysics: there is no mysterious cement of the sort for which 
Hume sought in vain-and in the later theory, modality is banished. 
But alas, the new mechanical philosophy must go the way of the old. 
In the new mechanism, relations between the properties or quantities pos- 
sessed by a process play a role in determining whether that process is 
causal or not, but these relations are not what we point to when we locate 
an explanandum within its causal nexus. What, then, is left to do the 
explaining? Only the naked processes and interactions, only a network 
of spacetime worms such as that depicted in figure 1. Such an explanation 
characterizes only a particular (albeit intricately fibrillated) region of 
spacetime as relevant to the outcome. In the new mechanical philosophy, 
as in the old, the explanatory store contains nought but geometric prop- 
erties. 
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